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Abstract
Pohjola ( 1983) derives open-loop Stackelberg solutions for the Lancaster
(19~3) model of capitalism and compares the outcomes with the open-loop Nash
outcome. Due to a shortcoming in the analysis only one open-loop Stackelberg
solution with the workers as leader was found. This comment shows that there
are in fact infinitely mar~y solutions. Furthermore, these solutions cen be







-I wish to thank Fons Groot for helpful commenta.1
1. Introduction
Lancaster (1973) described capitaliam as a differential game between
workera end capitalista in which the workers determine their share of con-
sumption in total output whereas the capitalista divide the remainder over
investment and their own consumption. The purpoae was to show the dynamic
inefficiency of capitalism by comparing the noncooperative Nash outcome with
the social optimum. Hcel (19~8) extended this analysis by considering the
whole set of Pareto efficient solutions.
Pohjola (1983) derived the open-loop Stackelberg solutions for the
Lancaster model of capitalism under both workers' and capitalists' leader-
ship. By comparing these outcomes with the open-loop Nash outcome it was
shown that capitalism is in a stalemate, because both clesses would prefer
to act as the follower in the Stackelberg game. BaSar, Haurie and Ricci
(1985) later analysed the feedback outcomes of the Lancaster game.
Following Wishart and Olsder (19~9), Pohjola (1983) used generalised
functions to hendle the technical difficulties, but an error was made in the
analysis. As a consequence of this only one open-loop Stackelberg solution
was found in each of the two cases. In this comment it is shown that there
are in fact infinitely many solutions for the most probable parameter
values. It is also shown that these solutions csn be derived wíth atandard
optimal control techniques. The valuea of the objective functiona are the
same for all solutions, so that the remainder of the analyais in Pohjola
(1983) still stands. In order to keep the comment short only the game wlth
the workers as leader is reconsidered.
Section 2 summarizes the Lancaster model of capitalism and derives by
means of stendard optimal control techniques the open-loop Stackelberg
solutions under workers' leadership. Section 3 shows why Pohjola (1983) only
found one solution. Section 4 is a short conclusion.
2. Open-loop Stackelberg solutions of the Lancaster game
The workers control their consumption rate ul and maximise their total





where K is the capital stock and a denotes the output-capital ratio. It is
assumed that c 5 ul(t) S b, t E[O,T], with 0( c C b and 0.5 l b~ 1.
The capitalists control the investment rate uZ w.r.t. the remaining output





The capital accumulation can be written as
(2)
K(t) - [1-ul(t)]u2(t)aK(t), K(0) - K0. (3)
The differential game (1)-(3) is called the Lancaster model of capitalism.
Suppose that the workers are the leader in the Stackelberg game and the
capitalists are the follower. The Hamiltonien function for the rational
reaction of the capitalists is given by
HZ(K,uz,y2,t) :- [1-ul(t)]{1-u2 i y2u2}aK.
Pontryagin's maximum principle yields the neceseary conditions (3),
1, yZ(t) ) 1
u2(t) z
0, y2(t) ( 1
and





According to Arrow's sufficiency theorem ( see e.g. Seieratad and Sydsaeter,
1987, p. 107) these conditions are also sufficient. The costate y2 is con-
tinuous, and monotonically decreasing because yZ(t) ( 0, t E(O,T).3
It follows that there are two poasibilities:
(1) Y2(0) 5 1
In this case uZ(t) - 0, t E(O,T], so that there is no investment end no
capital accumulation. This can occur when the workers claim e too large con-
sumption rate for themselvea or when there is too little time to take
advantage of the investment. The adjoint system (6) yielda that the integral
of ul over the time interval [O,T] must be bigger than or equsl to T- 1 e'
For T sufficiently large (T ) a lb ) this case can be ruled out, because
uI(t) 5 b, t E[O,T].
(2) Y2(0) ~ 1 .
In this case there is a point in time t2 with y2(t2) ~ 1 where the
capitalists switch from full investment uz(t) a 1, t E [O,t2), to no in-
vestment uZ(t) - 0, t E(tZ,T].
The rational reaction of the capitalists leads to the following
constraints for the maximisation problem of the workera:
(i) before t2 there is capital accumulation according to
K(t) - [1-ul(t)]aK(t), K(0) - K0,
and after t2 the capital stock is fixed: K(t) - K(t2), t E[t2,T].
(ii) after t2 the consumption rate uI has to satiafy
Y2(t) - [1-uI(t)]a.
yZ(t2) - 1. Y2(T) - 0.
which yielda
T




The objective functional of the workers becomes4
t2




The workers have to choose ul(t), t E[o,t2], end t2 E (o,T) in order to
maximise (9) subject to (7), and have to satiafy the constraint (8). The
maximisation problem is a simple optimal control problem with a scrap value
and a variable final time. The Hamiltonian function for this maximisation
problem is given by
H1(K,u1.Yl.c) :- {ul . yl[1-ul]}ax. (lo)
Necessary and sufficient conditions ( aee e.g. Seierstad and Sydsater, 1987,
P. 397-399) for the optimum are (7),
- ( b. Y1(t) C 1
ul(t) Jll
c, yl(t) ) 1,
91(t) - -{ullt) i yl(t)[1-ul(t)]}8.
yl(t2) - a(T - t2) - 1
and
{a(T - t2) - 2}[1-ul(t2)]aK(t2) - 0.
From (13) it follows that
t2-T-á,
so that yl(t2) - 1. Because yl(t) ~ o, t
decreasing. This implies that ul(t) ~ c, t
If c 5 0.5, then the constraint ( 8) can be






met, so that there is a multi-
with the workera as leader:5
ul(t) - c, uZ(t) - 1, t E[O,T - á)
T
J ul(t) - á, u2(t) ~ 0, t E(T - á,T].
T - z á
(15)
If c) 0.5, then the constraint (8) cannot be met. To put it differently,
the workers have to choose t in the tíme interval [T 1,T - 1] 2 - a -b a 1-c
in order to be able to meet the constraint (8). The optimal tz, given by
(14), now lies to the right of this. Because the left-hand side of (13) is




with yl(t2) ) 1 and again ul(t) - c, t E[O,t2). There is now only one open-
loop Stackelberg solution with the workers as leader:
ul(t) - c, u2(t) - 1, t E[~.T - a llc )
ul(t) - c. uZ(t) - 0. t E (T - B lc .T].
The conclusion is that in the case c 5 0.5 there are infinitely many open-
loop Stackelberg solutions with the workers as leader, given by (15). An
example is the bang-bang control in Pohjola (1983) where the workera con-
tinue at the point in time T- á with the low consumption rate c and switch
to the high consumption rate b at the point in time T- alb?c . Another
example is the situation where the workers claim an average consumption rate
ul(t) - 0.5 on the whole time interval (T - á,T]. It dces not matter how the
workers spread their total consumption over that time interval. As long as
they announce the same level of modesty they induce the capitalists to in-
vest longer than in the open-loop Nash outcome.6
3. The derivation with generaliaed functions
Following Wlshart and Olsder (1979), Pohjola (1983) performs the analyais
in the much more complex space of generalised functions, in which the
function u2, given by (5). hes a time derivative equel to the delta function
-b(t-t2). One error is made in the analyais. In contrast to what ia
presented in table 4(Pohjola, 1983, p. 183). the costate z(Pohjola, 1983.
equation (24)) is constant and equal to -yl(t2)K(t2) on the whole time in-
terval (tZ,T] (see e.g. Gel'fand and Shilov, 1964). Note that the costate yl
here is not the same as in section 2 of this comment. It follows that the
switching function B(Pohjola, 1983, equation (27)) is constant and equal to
[1 - yl(t2)]K(t2) on the whole time interval (t2,T]. Therefore the switching
function B cennot determine a switch in the optimal consumption rate ul in
this time interval.
One can proceed as follows. The adjoint systems for y2 and yl (Pohjola,
1983. equationa (19) and (23)) become on the time interval [tZ,T]
YZ(t) - -a[1-ul(t)],
and
y2(t2) - 1, y2(T) - 0
yl(t) L -aul(t).
Y1(T) - 0.
There are three possibilities:
(1) B(t) ) 0, t E(t2.T] or yl(t2) C 1, so that ul(t) ~ b, t E(t2,T].
This leads to a contradiction with b) 0.5.
(2) B(t) - 0, t E(tz,T] or Y1(t2) - 1.
This yields t2 - T- á and finally leads to the multiple open-loop
Stackelberg solutions for c 5 0.5, given by (15).
(3) B(t) ( 0, t E(t2,T] or yl(t2) ) 1, so that ul(t) - c, t E(t2,T].
This yields t2 - T- a lic and finally leads to the single open-loop
Stackelberg solution For c) 0.5, given by (17).4. Conclusion
This comment shows that there are infinitely many open-loop Stackelberg
solutions for the Lencaster model of capitalism under workera' leadership.
Furthermore, it ia shown that it is not necessary to employ optimal control
theory in the space of generalised functions, becauae the problem of the
leader can be seen as a simple optimal control problem with a scrap value
and a variable final time.
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